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I
The opinion of British people expressed at the referendum on 23 June 2016 deciding to leave
the European Union came as a shock for many supporters of the country’s EU membership.
However, if we look back at history, we have to realise, that this reserved or sometimes even
hostile attitude towards strong continental ties is not unprecedented in the history of England. 
We may refer Henry’s VIII’s 1533 Act in Restraint of Appeals to Rome, which forbade all
appeals to the Pope in Rome on religious and other matters and claimed ‘this realm of England
is an empire’. Although this Act reflected a very concrete private matter1 of the King, it became
the legal foundation of English reformation and resulted in the separation of England from the
leading spiritual power in Europe. One year later, another Act was passed, the Act of Supremacy
which declared that the King as a ‘sovereign lord’ was ‘the only supreme head in earth of the
Church of England called Anglicana Ecclesia’. Even the teaching of Canon Law was supressed
at the universities, replaced by secular Roman Law.
The next centuries experienced the rise of the British Empire. By the mid-19th century, the
United Kingdom had become the strongest colonial power – governing the crown jewel of India,
amongst others – and the first industrial state in the world. During this period of time the main
goal of British foreign policy was to keep the classical balance of power in the European continent.
It effectively prevented the continental hegemony of Spain, France and later Germany.2
The words of Lord Palmerston perfectly described this approach, which dominated British
foreign policy for centuries: ‘I hold with respect to alliances, that England is a Power sufficiently
strong, sufficiently powerful, to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary
appendage to the policy of any other Government. (…) We have no eternal allies, and we have
no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty
to follow. (…)’3 Besides this, the United Kingdom, as an imperial power, quite logically developed
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a kind of global approach towards foreign policy and matters of international commerce. In this
very large field of manoeuvring, Europe was only one, and not necessarily the most important
scene of events.
II
Against this background, it is not surprising that the idea of European integration emerged only
in theoretical thinking in Britain for a long time. It is still worthwhile to mention William Penn,
who published ‘An essay towards the present and future peace in Europe’ in 1693. In this study,
he suggested the introduction of a European Parliament – an assembly, where the number of
MPs representing a country was proportional to the population, territory, and economy of the
participating countries. He suggested a kind of ‘weighted voting’ in its decision-making, too. Of
course there was no practical chance of implementing his ideas in Europe; later he sailed to
North America and there established Pennsylvania, organised according to democratic
principles.
At the end of the 19th century, when it became clear for some leading politicians that the
price of preserving the balance of power in Europe could be very high, the idea of European
integration started to infiltrate into the political thoughts of English politicians as well. We may
recall the statement of Lord Salisbury, Conservative prime minister, written in 1897: ‘The
federated action of Europe, if we can maintain it, is our sole hope of escaping from the constant
terror and calamity of war, the constant pressure of the burdens of armed peace, which weigh
down the spirits and darken the prospects of every nation in this part of the world. The
Federation of Europe is the only hope we have.’4
Naturally, we have to mention Winston Churchill too, and not only his famous Zurich
speech delivered in 1946, suggesting a United States of Europe. As early as 1930, he devoted an
article to the ‘United States of Europe’ in the Saturday Evening Post, responding positively to
Aristide Briand’s proposal for a European Union.5 During the Second World War, in 1942, he
wrote the following note to Anthony Eden: ‘I must admit that my thoughts rest primarily in
Europe – the revival of the glory of Europe, the parent continent of the modern nations and
civilisation It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and
independence of the ancient states of Europe. Hard it is to say now, I trust that the European
family must act unitedly as one under a Council of Europe… I look forward to a United States
of Europe in which the barriers between the nations will be greatly minimised and unrestricted
travel will be possible. I hope to see the economy of Europe studied as a whole.’6
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Or we can cite the rather prophetic words of Harold Macmillan from 1939: ‘Many people
are asking what kind of Europe one could hope to emerge out of the chaos of today. The picture
could only be painted in the broadest colours. But if Western civilisation is to survive, we must
look forward to an organisation, economic, cultural and perhaps even political, comprising all
the countries of Western Europe’.7
Despite all their eloquence, these words did not necessarily represent the focus of actions
of the cited eminent politicians and they were often far from the mainstream of British politics.
Lord Salisbury served as prime minister during the peak of British imperial power, so India,
Africa and the development of the navy dominated his foreign policy. Churchill was an ardent
supporter of European integration – but without the participation of the United Kingdom. The
ties with the still existing colonies and the connections with the ‘English-speaking peoples’8 lay
deep in his political thoughts. Macmillan submitted the first request for UK membership of the
European Communities but, parallel with it, he strengthened the relationship and military
cooperation with the USA which – among other factors – led to the veto of de Gaulle to British
accession in 1963.9
III
Even a more detailed analysis does not alter fundamentally the above documented Janus-faced
attitude of British political thinking and politics towards European integration, although the
picture is more nuanced. We have to differentiate between the voices of intellectuals, business
people and the opinion of the Foreign Office. Amongst academics, the federalist idea became
increasingly popular from the end of the 19th century, in opposition to the liberal free trade
approach. This was partly a reaction to the looming menace of a great war with the rising
European power of Germany and partly an attempt to counterbalance the vast market of the
United States and the unprecedented pace of economic development there. This economic
argument was echoed by business and the Treasury in the government, too. However, the
supporters of federalism pursued different goals. Some of them advocated an Imperial
Federation as an answer to the American experience, having the aim of transforming the British
colonial system into a federation and an economic bloc. The Imperial Federation League was
founded in 1884; the political leader of the movement was Joseph Chamberlain.10 The idea
survived the First World War and was strongly supported by several representatives of the
British industry.11 Another group of British federalists supported deeper transatlantic ties,
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envisaging an Atlantic Federation with the United States of America. The idea of creating more
European integration was a third concept flourished under the umbrella of federalist movement.
Already in 1871 Sir John Seely, professor of modern history at Cambridge, published an article
entitled United States of Europe,12 as did W.T. Stead, the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette and
Review of Reviews.13 The concept of a European federation was strongly supported by several
professors during the interwar period especially by some members of the London School of
Economics, such as Harold Laski and Ivor Jennings, who devoted a book to the subject under
the title ‘A Federation of Western Europe’.14
However, the British governments followed a  strategy to restore the former strategic
equilibrium of major powers even after the First World War, until the time of the great
depression.15 The attitude of the Foreign Office was much reserved regarding a European
Federation. It was therefore unprepared for the initiative of Aristide Briand on a future European
federation in 1929. There was an ‘inadequacy of intelligence on the European movement’.16 The
words of Sir William Tyrell, permanent under-secretary, were quite symptomatic, as he
evaluated the work and efforts of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, founder of the Pan-
European Society thus: ‘I know Coudenhove: he is a thoroughly impractical theorist’17. Later,
however as ambassador to France, he changed his sceptical view. A decade later, there was
a unique moment in history, which could have radically changed the tide of events. In June
1940, during the worst days of German invasion in France, Churchill, supported by his Cabinet,
accepted the proposal of an ‘indissoluble union’, with shared citizenship between the United
Kingdom and France. The Franco-British Union could have had joint organs not only for
defence but for foreign, financial and economic policies. Reynaud, the French prime minister
at that time, was ready to accept the initiative; however, his government replaced him by
Marshal Pétain and capitulated.18 This was a very serious blow to the federalist idea in the
United Kingdom.
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IV
Although the federalist idea was not unknown to British political culture (or even popular,
bearing in mind the looming menace of Second World War on the horizon), after the Second
World War it lost its momentum. A Labour government was formed after the elections in 1945.
The new Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, earlier seemed to be a supporter of European federa -
tion, and he delivered a speech in 1939 using the slogan ‘Europe must federate or perish’19, but
after the war his main concern was to build the National Health Service and to nationalise the key
industries. The Labour party was very reluctant to join to a ‘capitalist club’, as they called the
plans for European integration.20 After the Hague Conference, devoted to support European
unity, in April 1948, ‘Labour observers noted that the attendance was overwhelmingly
representative of Conservative and capitalist groups’21. So, when in May 1950 the French
minister of foreign affairs, Robert Schuman, made his historic proposal to pool the French and
West German coal and steel industries, the British Government rejected participation in the
project. The decisive factors behind this refusal – besides the above mentioned suspicion –
were probably economic. Roughly 40 percent of British exports and imports were related to the
Commonwealth. The Board of Trade opposed British participation in European integration.22
In addition, the Labour Government was not ready to pass control over the freshly nationalized
steel industry to a supranational authority. Most probably the rank and file of the Labour Party
would have rejected such a shift, too. Even the French invitation to participate was somewhat
half-hearted. The British Government did not get a forewarning of the Schuman Plan, although
even the US Secretary of State was informed before the announcement.23 As a consequence, the
European Coal and Steel Community was established without the participation of the United
Kingdom.
However, the real great disillusionment for federalists came in 1951. The Tories and Churchill
were returned to power, but Great Britain no longer championed the cause of European integra -
tion. There were several reasons behind this approach. One of them was the ‘ambivalence, if not
a division within the ranks of the Conservatives over Europe’, as it was described by Harold
Macmillan. (It is quite characteristic that the pro-Europe Macmillan was made Minister of
Housing, effectively removing him from the European scene.) The foreign secretary became
Martin Eden, a Eurosceptic24 who focused on the problem of Suez instead of Europe. The
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attention of Churchill was absorbed by the Cold War and by the efforts to build a  ‘special
relationship’ with the United States.25 The transatlantic and Commonwealth axes were clearly
more important for him than the British position in Europe.26
The scepticism towards European integration seemed to be justified for some years, due to
the manifest failure of the efforts to create a European Defence Community in 1953-1954. The
mainstream British view was therefore quite convinced that even the Messina negotiations
started in 1955, preparing for the European Atomic Energy Community and the general
common market of the European Economic Community, would not bring any result. As
Macmillan wrote in his memoirs ‘The official view seemed to be a confident expectation that
nothing would come out of Messina.’27 The British administration failed to grasp the importance
of this development, the establishment of integration based on the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital in all sectors. Of course, the traditional fears of the exclusion of
Commonwealth trade and the related reluctance to accept common external tariffs28 applied by
the participating European states strengthened this reserved attitude. These considerations
overruled the fact that even the United States supported the new project. As a result, the United
Kingdom was represented only at a  low level at the Messina Conference and – having no
prepared position29 –, did not take part actively in shaping the structures of the new
cooperation. Instead of the negotiated scheme, the British government initiated a loose free-
trade zone, excluding agricultural products. However this was not acceptable to France, a major
exporter of such products.30 Again, the two new Communities were established without the
participation of the country.
V
In less than a decade came the U-turn in British foreign policy, in 1961 Harold Macmillan, by
then prime minister, applied for membership of the European Communities. This move can be
explained by several factors, first that European economic integration turned out to be a success.
A spectacular development in trade and economic growth was experienced in the six founding
states, much more robust in nature than that in the UK. The support of the USA remained firm
regarding the EEC, rejecting alternative ways of transatlantic economic co-operation. There
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were fears that the successful European Communities might also develop strong military
cooperation without the United Kingdom. Plus, in a short period of time, it became obvious that
the Commonwealth did not necessarily follow the British position on foreign or economic
policy; the leading role of Britain was not unquestionable there. This changed reality was
mirrored by the press, the Financial Times, The Guardian, The Observer and The Times started
to argue in favour of membership.31
However, the golden momentum for becoming a founding Member of the integration had
already passed. During the sixties the position of the European Community was dominated by
the French president De Gaulle, who was more than sceptical about the UK’s membership,
considering the country the US ‘Trojan Horse’ in Europe, and he vetoed her accession twice, in
1963 and in 1967. One may say that this was an ungrateful move since Britain had saved France
twice in the World Wars; however, we have to admit retrospectively that there was some merit
is his argument: ‘England in fact is insular, maritime, bound by her trade, her markets, her
supplies, to countries that are very diverse and often very far away… How can England, as she
lives, as she produces, as she trades, be incorporated in the Common Market?’32 So Britain had
to wait until the resignation of De Gaulle in 1969 and finally became a member of the European
Communities only in 1973. The century-old dilemma regarding the relationships with Europe
was settled – at least at first sight. The negotiations on the terms of accession were not easy.
Britain, as a late-comer, had to accept the structures and models hammered out earlier by the
six founding Member States. Some issues, such as the impact of the Common Agricultural
Policy on the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, or the contribution to the Community
budget, haunted British politicians for several more years or even decades.
In January 1972, Edward Heath, Conservative prime minister, delivered a  fine speech,
celebrating the closure of ‘arduous negotiations over more than ten years’ leading to the
accession of the United Kingdom. In his contribution, he struck a good balance between national
interests and European commitment: ‘Clear thinking will be needed to recognise that each of
us within the Community will remain proudly attached to our national identity and to the
achievements of our national history and tradition. But at the same time, as the enlargement of
the Community makes clear beyond doubt, we have all come to recognize our common
European heritage, our mutual interests and our European destiny’33.
With hindsight, we may risk saying that Edward Heath was probably the only British prime
minister who felt a genuine enthusiasm towards the cause of European integration.34 However,
the dissenting opinions emerged soon as well. In fact, already during the accession negotiations
there was a legal attempt before the courts to prevent the British government to accede to the
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European Communities.35 In Blackburn v Attorney General,36 proceedings were started to get
a ruling that it would be unlawful for the Government to sign the Accession Treaty, surrendering
part of the sovereignty of the Crown and the Parliament. However the claim was dismissed, as
was the appeal against the dismissal. It is worth recalling the opinion of the outstanding British
judge of that time, Lord Denning, who clearly realised the transfer of competences to the EC but
maintained that the courts did not have the power to decide upon such issues, and emphasised
the dualist approach between international law and domestic law:
‘Much of what Mr. Blackburn says is quite correct. It does appear that if this country should
go into the Common Market and sign the Treaty of Rome, it means that we will have taken
a step which is irreversible. The sovereignty of these islands will thenceforward be limited. It will
not be ours alone but will be shared with others. 
(…) Even if a treaty is signed, it is elementary that these courts take no notice of treaties as
such. We take no notice of treaties until they are embodied in laws enacted by Parliament, and
then only to the extent that Parliament tells us. That was settled in a case about a treaty between
the Queen of England and the Emperor of China’.37
Finally, the European Communities Bill was passed by both Houses of the Parliament after
tough debates but without a single amendment and entered into force on 1 January 1973.38
VI
This was still not the end of the stormy history of British accession. After two elections in
February and October 1974 a Labour Government replaced the Conservative cabinet of Edward
Heath with a promise to renegotiate the terms and conditions of British accession and asking
the opinion of the people on British membership. The underlying reasons behind this promise
were mainly domestic. The Labour Party won only by a thin majority at the second election in
1974. A campaign against Brussels might have been considered as a good cause for uniting the
divided nation, since it was an issue which penetrated across party lines. Moreover, the crusade
against EC membership was wholeheartedly supported by the left wing of the Labour Party,
which had very strong ties with the trade unions. The demand for renegotiation of the
conditions of accession was mainly a tactical device in the hands of the prime minister, who
pragmatically accepted British membership of the EC, but not according to the terms negotiated
by the former Conservative Government.39 During the renegotiations the most sensitive issues
were revisited, such as the access of Commonwealth products to the EC, reform of the CAP and
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the size of British contributions to the budget of the European Communities.40 Finally
a reasonable compromise was reached, although the tough negotiations had a negative impact
on the perception among other Member States regarding the British attitude towards Europe.
The role of UK being an ‘awkward partner’41 in the European integration goes back to this
period of time. The renegotiation and its results were presented as a great victory in the
domestic context. Based on this, the prime minister and the majority of his Cabinet members
supported the renegotiated terms of accession. In Parliament, the majority of Labour MPs voted
against the new terms; however the vote went in favour of acceptance, thanks to the support of
the Conservative Party headed by Margaret Thatcher. She gave three principal reasons
explaining her position: peace and security, a guaranteed food supply and a future role for Britain
on the world stage.42 Even so, she left the greater part of the Conservative referendum campaign
in 1975 to the former Tory prime minister, Edward Heath.43
The referendum on membership was considered by many Conservative politicians as alien
to British constitutional traditions. A good amount of populism was injected into the campaign,
and a strange alliance was formed against EC membership, including the extreme right National
Front and the extreme left of the political spectrum: the left wing of the Labour Party plus the
marginal Maoist and Trotskyist groups. Despite the negative campaign, the referendum
confirmed British membership with an unexpected two-third majority in favour (67.2 per cent)
based on a high turnout of voters (64. 6 per cent). The UK’s membership of the EC at that time
seemed to be finally settled.44
However, forty years later, it became obvious that the heart of the British lion did not change
and remained tortured by the disputes, prejudices, doubts and fears of the past century. The
great political battle continued; moreover, the very same arms were deployed in the struggle, the
renegotiation of conditions of EU membership followed by a popular vote and cases before the
courts. So, we have to accept the opinion: ‘No one familiar with British history should be
surprised at the verdict of the referendum. For Britain’s relationship with the Continent has
always been uneasy’.45
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